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Abstract
Data center operators deploy a variety of both physical and virtual network func-
tions boxes (NFBs) to take advantages of inherent efficiency offered by physical
NFBs with the agility and flexibility of virtual ones. However, such hetero-
geneity faces great challenges in correct, efficient and dynamic network policy
implementation because, firstly, existing schemes are limited to exclusively phys-
ical or virtual NFBs and not a mix, and secondly, NFBs can co-exist at various
locations in the network as a result of emerging technologies such as Software
Defined Networking (SDN) and network function virtualization (NFV).
In this paper, we propose a Heterogeneous netwOrk pOlicy enforCement
scheme (HOOC) to overcome these challenges. We first formulate and model
HOOC, which is shown be to NP-Hard by reducing from the Multiple Knap-
sack Problem (MKP). We then propose an efficient online algorithm that can
achieve optimal latency-wise NF service chaining amongst heterogenous NFBs.
In addition, we also provide a greedy algorithm when operators prefer smaller
run-time than optimality.Our simulation results show that HOOC is efficient
and scalable whilst testbed implementation demonstrates that HOOC can be
easily deployed in the data center environments.
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1. Introduction
Data center operators deploy a great variety of network functions (NFs)
such as firewall (FWs), content filter, intrusion prevention/detection system
(IPS/IDS), deep packet inspection (DPI), network address translation (NAT),
HTTP/TCP performance optimizer, load balancer (LB), and etc., at various5
points in the network topology to safeguard networks and improve application
performance [1]. Each network function is responsible for specific treatment
of received packets, including forwarding, dropping, rate-limiting, inspecting,
and/or modifying packets. In practice, various permutations of or subsets of
these functions form an ordered composition (or service chain) – as defined by10
a network policy [2] – that must be applied to packets in uni-directional or
bi-directional manner. This process is also known as network service chaining
[3]. Hence, network policy enforcement implies correct and efficient chaining of
network functions.
Nowadays, network functions are either embedded in purpose-built propri-15
etary hardware, i.e., middleboxes (MBs), or appear as virtual instances running
on top of commodity servers through NFV (Network Function Virtualization).
We term both hardware middleboxes and NFV servers as Network Function
Boxes (NFBs). Physical NFBs are more efficient because they are built with
dedicate hardware for optimizing the performance of specific functions but are20
proprietary and hence less extensible. On the other hand, virtualized NFBs
have the agility for rapid on-demand deployment and greater degree of pro-
grammability for software automation but are less efficient due to virtualization
overhead, resource sharing, and general-purpose hardware [4].
In addition to hardware middleboxes and general-purpose NFV servers, with25
the power of SDN (Software Defined Networking), some simple network function
such as firewall and NAT can also be easily and efficiently implemented in SDN
switches [5].
Obviously, except purpose-built physical NFBs, a network function can be
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independently allocated to different servers and SDN switches in the network30
or collocated with other network functions within a switch or server [3][6].
In fact, today’s data center operators adopt mixture of both physical and
virtual NFBs to captialize on the efficiency of physical ones and the agility and
flexibility of virtual ones [3].
Nevertheless, coming with this hybrid heterogeneous paradigm are signif-35
icant challenges on the correct implementation of network policies in today’s
data centers: (1) Support for deployment of network policies is limited exclu-
sively to either physical or virtualized NFBs. There is no existing mechanisms
for supporting simultaneous use of both form factors [2][7][8][9]; (2) Large va-
riety of NFBs at distinct network locations means that the choices for correct40
service chaining has grown exponentially. We show that large variation in round
trip times (RTTs) can be observed for NFBs with different capacity (detailed
in Section 2). Given most data center workloads are latency-sensitive and are
prone to unpredictable slowdown along the end-to-end links [10][11], how could
we ensure that latency for all policy chains is optimal?45
In this paper, we propose a Heterogeneous netwOrk pOlicy enforCement
scheme (HOOC), which is an adaptive network policy implementation scheme
that will not only support the use of both physical and virtual NFBs but also
minimize latency along the policy path (i.e. service chain) such that end-to-end
delay will become more predictable. Our experimental evaluation demonstrates50
that HOOC can achieve optimal placement of network functions amongst het-
erogeneous NFBs.
The contribution of this paper is fourfold.
1. We experimentally show that performance heterogeneity for running same
network functions on different NFBs.55
2. We formulate HOOC and prove that it is NP-Hard, by reducing from the
Multiple Knapsack Problem (MKP).
3. We model the heterogeneity of NFBs by constructing cost network graphs
and propose an efficient online Shortest Service Chain Path (SSP)
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algorithm for finding the shortest path (minimal latency) for any given60
policy in a cost network graph.
4. Our simulation results show that the HOOC scheme is efficient and scal-
able. Our testbed results show that the HOOC scheme is practical.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents
our simple experiments on revealing performance heterogeneity across the same65
network function on different NFBs of various capacity. Section 3 describes
the problem formulation and the model of HOOC. Efficient schemes for HOOC
are proposed in Section 4, followed by testbed implementation the performance
evaluation of HOOC in Section 5 and Section 6 respectively. Section 7 out-
lines related works, and Section 8 concludes the paper and indicates the future70
direction of this work.
2. NFB Performance Heterogeneity
In order to understand the extent to which the performance heterogeneity
existing amongst the same network functions on different NFB configurations,
we have carried out a set of simple experiments using three commodity servers75
and one Pronto 3295 SDN switch. Each server is configured with an Intel’s
Xeon E5-1604 4 cores CPU, 16GB RAM and a dual port 1 Gbps NIC (Network
Interface Card), and with Ubuntu 14.04 as operating system. One server has
been used as virtualised NFB, with KVM (Kernel-based Virtual Machine) as
the hypervisor. The other two servers have been used for running iPerf [12]80
client and server respectively. Both the client and server were connected to the
NFB directly via 1 Gbp/s links. We have also used a Pronto 3295 SDN switch
to emulate a hardware NFB.
We have used two popular open-sourced software – Firewall (pfSense v2.3.1
[13]) and IDS/IPS (Snort v2.9.8 [14]) – as our network functions. For firewall85
experiments, a NAT has been created and used, meaning that the client and
server resided in two different networks. For IDS/IPS experiments, both client
4
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Figure 1: CDF of RTTs for pfSense and Snort NFBs with different numbers of allocated
virtual CPU.
and server were in the same network, meaning that the two physical network
ports on the NFB were bridged by software bridge. IDS/IPS rules used were
default rules pulled from Snort website. In addition to virtualized firewall, we90
have also programmed the SDN controller to write some static flow entries to
the Pronto switch to make it a simple hardware-based NAT.
In all experiments, we have used iPerf to stress the server with TCP requests
and record the traffic with tcpdump on both client and server. Since we are par-
ticularly interested in the end-to-end latency, we have used Wireshark (tshark)95
to compute packet round-trip-time (RTT) from recorded traffic streams.
2.1. Correlation with number of CPUs
We first study the correlation of performance heterogeneity of network func-
tion with different number of allocated CPUs on NFB. In this set of experiments,
we have first allocated only one vCPU (1 vCPUs, 2GB RAM) for both pfSense100
and Snort servers and then increased the number of vCPUs to two, while keeping
the memory (2 vCPUs, 2GB RAM) and other configurations unchanged.
The computed RTT from the recorded traffic has been demonstrated in Fig-
ure 1. Since no links in this setup are over-subscribed, the likelihood of traffic
congestion is low. Thus, processing delay accounts for significant portion of end-105
to-end latency. Clearly, Figure 1a shows that having twice as much hardware
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Figure 2: CDF of RTTs for pfSense and Snort NFBs with different sizes of allocated memory.
resource does not significantly improve RTT as there is only about 5% improve-
ment at the region above 80 percentile. In comparison, the hardware switch
implementation has much smaller and predictable RTT, even at 99 percentile.
Figure 1b shows more diverse performance results amongst two configurations110
for Snort IDS/IPS in which 2 vCPUs could give significantly better performance
up to as much as 100%. The steps observed in figures are attributed to the dif-
ferent computation demands required by various intrusion detection rules. This
means some packets are scrutinized more heavily whereas some are less.
In addition, we have also noticed that the magnitude of RTT for Snort is115
two orders higher than that of pfSense. This is because the pfSense’s workload
was mainly on examining the packet header for NAT translation, whereas for
IDS/IPS the workload was mainly on deep packet inspection.
2.2. Correlation with size of memory
In this set of experiments, we have only altered the configuration (1 vCPU,120
2GB RAM) to increase the size of memory from 1GB to 4GB (1 vCPU, 4GB
RAM). The results shown in Figure 2 exhibit only small differences in perfor-
mance across two configurations. Clearly, this set of experiments has revealed
that the performance of network function is largely limited by NFB’s process-
ing capacity rather than its amount of memory (as long as it meets minimum125
requirements).
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3. Problem Modeling
Table 1: Notations and Parameters
Symbol Description
B, bi B is set of all NFBs, bi ∈ B
Cap(bi), T ypeSet(bi) maximum capability and supported NF types of bi
N, ni N is set of all NFs, ni ∈ N
Type(ni), Req(ni), Loc(ni) function type of ni, processing requirement of ni and
the NFB hosts ni
P, pi P is set of all network policies, pi ∈ P
srci, dsti source and destination of pi
Len(pi) number of NFs in pi
Pi all possible sequence of pi with re-ordering
D(ni, nj) dealy between ni and nj
tis, t
i
w service time and average waiting time of ni
λi packet arrival rate of ni
tp(ni) processing delay of ni
T (pi) expected delay for the flow constrained by pi
Bj nodes in the jth tier of the service chain network
In this section, we will describe the heterogeneous network policy problem.
Table 1 summaries notations used in the paper.
3.1. Overview130
In this paper, as opposed to existing works which only consider homoge-
neous NFBs deployment, we consider a heterogeneous environment. Network
functions can be implemented at various network locations, either in-network or
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at-edge, and on different kinds of NFBs such as hardware middleboxes, commod-
ity servers, and (SDN) switches/routers. These NFBs are distinctively different135
in the following ways:
• Hardware middbleboxes are vendor specific, proprietary boxes for providing
specific network functions. Their designs are often optimized for perfor-
mance and are less extensible. On the contrary,
• NFV servers are virtualized that can run multiple, and theoretically, any140
types of virtual network functions. As they are built on virtualization,
better agility can be guaranteed.
• Some simple network functions can also be implemented on switches or
routers such as VPN, simple firewalls which can only perform packet fil-
tering, and load balancers. They are amongst hardware middleboxes.145
However, SDN can allow us to exploit the OpenFlow switches to increase
the performance of service chain by installing some rules (i.e., network
function) to their flow tables [5].
Since each types of NFs implementations above have their own advantages, we
anticipate that the heterogeneous implementation of network functions will exist150
for the foreseeable future.
Denote B = {b1, b2, . . .} to be the set of all NFBs in a data center. For a
NFB bi, Cap(bi) denotes the maximum processing capability of bi, measuring
in number of packets per second (pps), e.g., 3800 pps [15]. TypeSet(bi) specifies
the set of supported network function types on bi. NFV servers, theoretically,155
support all types of network function, while hardware MBs and switches can
only support one or few types of network functions. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the memory space of NFBs are enough to accommodate states
information of all network functions, i.e., bottleneck is the processing capacity
as shown in Section 2.160
Let N = {n1, n2, . . .} be the set of all network function instances in data
center. The Type(ni) defines the function of ni, e.g., IPS/IDS, LB, or FW.
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Req(ni) is essentially the requirement of ni on the processing capacity of NFBs
in pps. Loc(ni) is the NFB that currently hosts ni. One main objective in this
paper is to find an appropriated NFB for Loc(ni).165
The set of network functions in N may belong to different applications, and
are deployed and configured by a centralized Policy Controller [9]. The central-
ized Policy Controller monitors and controls the liveness of network functions
and NFBs, including addition, failure/removal or migration of a network func-
tion. Network administrators can specify and update policies through the Policy170
Controller.
The set of network policies is P, which can be defined by users or admin-
istrators. In reality, one policy can be applied to multiple flows and a single
flow can be subject to the governance of multiple policies. For each pi ∈ P,
srci and dsti specify the source and destination of pi respectively. All packets175
matched to them should be constrained by pi. The ordered list contained in pi
defines the sequence of NFs that all flows matching policy pi should traverse
in order, and pi[j] refers to the jth NF. For example, pi = (n1, n2, n3), where
Type(n1) = FW,Type(n2) = IPS, Type(n3) = Proxy. And Len(pi) is number
of NFs of pi.180
All NFs in pi must be assigned to appropriate NFBs beforehand, and we
assume there are enough NFBs to accommodate all required network functions
in data center. Since we consider heterogeneous network functions, there are
various possible locations for each network function in pi. For example, in
the above example of pi, Loc(n1) could be a core router, Loc(n2) could be a185
hardware NFB, and Loc(n3) could be a NFV server. An example of service
chain is given in Figure 3. Next, we will consider the problem of heterogeneous
policy placement.
3.2. Delays with network functions
There are many metrics to measure the efficiency of network function place-190
ment (service function chaining) for a policy such as communication cost [16][17].
In this paper, we mainly focus on the latency of a policy flow. However, the
9
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main idea in this paper can be easily applied to other metrics.
The total delay of a flow includes the transmission delay among adjacent
network functions in the service chain and processing delay of network functions.195
3.2.1. Transmission delays
In order to steer traffic to the service chain, either Policy Based Routing
(PBR) or VLAN stitching can be used in data centers [3]. For either case,
the intended solution in this paper should be unaware of these schemes and is
general and applicable to the schemes. So, we do not consider the detailed200
routing between two NFBs.
Since, in production data centers, the transmission delay of links in its path
are relatively stable and can be easily obtained/estimated through large-scale
measurement [18], we assume the transmission delay between two network func-
tions is known and can be obtained through the controller.205
The controller will maintain a transmission delay matrix D, D(ni, nj) =
D(nj , ni) is the delay between ni an nj . D(ni, nj) = −1 if the delay is unknown
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or they are unreachable. In either cases, paths with D(ni, nj) = −1 will not be
considered for arrangement of service chains.
3.2.2. Processing delays of network functions210
We define service time tis as the time that ni takes to process a packet. Since
that many network functions such as proxies, firewalls and load balancers only
process packet headers of which sizes are fixed, ignoring variable length data
payloads. Thus, the service time tis is a constant [19]. Specially, considering the
processing capacity Req(ni) of ni, t
i
s = 1/Req(ni).215
If packets arrival rates is smaller than the processing capacity of network
function, the processing delay is equal to the service time. Otherwise, packets
will be queued. For simplicity, we consider a M/D/1 queue, and network func-
tions process packets in a First-Come-First-Service (FCFS) discipline. Then,
the processing delay is the summation of waiting time and service time. The220
packet arrival rate for ni is the total rates of all flows that need to be processed
by ni, which is denoted by λi. The utilization ρi = λi ∗ tis. The average waiting
time tiw of ni is
tiw =
tis ∗ ρ
2(1− ρ) =
λi ∗ tis2
2(1− λi ∗ tis)
(1)
Thus, the processing delay of ni is:
tp(ni) =
t
i
s λi ≤ Req(ni)
tiw + t
i
s λi > Req(ni)
(2)
3.3. NF Behavior and Re-ordering of Service Chain225
We have surveyed a wide range of common network functions and service
chains to understand their common behaviors and properties. Most of these NFs
perform limited types of processing on packets, e.g., watching flows but making
no modification, changing packet headers and/or payload. For example, in
the simplest case, a flow monitor (FlowMon) obtains operational visibility into230
the network to characterize network and application performance, and it never
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modify packet and flows [3]. Some NFs, e.g., IDS, will check packet headers
and payload, and raise alerts to the system administrator. Some NFs (such
as firewalls and IPS) do not change packet headers and payload, but they use
packet header information to make decision on whether to drop the packet or235
forward it. Some NFs (such as NAT and LB) may check IP/port fields in
packet headers and rewrite these fields [7]. Others (such as traffic shaper) do
not modify packet headers and payloads, but may perform traffic shaping tasks
such as active queue management or rate limiting [20].
For a service chain, certain ordering requirement of NFs naturally exists due240
to the nature of the functions applied. For instance, for a service chain applied
to North-South traffic in datacenters, a Web Optimization Control (WOC) is
not effective on VPN traffic, requiring VPN termination prior to WOC [3]. For
other service chain with IDS and FlowMon, since IDS never change the packet
content, FlowMon can be applied to the traffic after IDS or placed prior to IDS.245
If the order of some NFs in a service chain is allowed to be re-organized, there
could be more opportunities to improve performance by reducing the length of
the service chain path such as the example shown in Figure 3.
In order to model these properties of NFs and leverage these properties, we
can classify NFs into several classes according to their behaviors:250
• Modifier (M): NFs that may modify the content of a packet (header or
payload), e.g., NAT, Proxy;
• Shaper (Sh): NFs that perform traffic shaping tasks such as active queue
management or rate limiting, e.g., rate limiter.
• Dropper: NFs that may drop packets of flows, but never modify header255
of payload of packets, e.g., firewall.
• Static : NFs do not modify the packet or its forwarding path, and in
general do not belong to the classes above, e.g., FlowMon, IDS.
Table 2 summarizes the dynamic actions performed by different NFs that are
commonly used today.260
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Table 2: Examples of the dynamic actions performed by different NFs that are commonly
used today [7]
Network Functions Input Actions Type
FlowMon Header No change Static
IDS Header, Payload No change Static
Firewall Header Drop? Dropper
IPS Header, Payload Drop? Dropper
NAT Header Rewrite header Modifier
Load balancer Header Rewrite header Modifier
Redundancy eliminator Payload Rewrite payload Modifier
To preserve the correctness of service chain, users can specify constraints
on the order of NFs in service chains. For example, we can change the order
of static NFs, and move static NFs before Dropper NFs. However, we cannot
move static NFs across Modifiers, as this might lead to incorrect operation.
In the example shown in Figure 3, the service chain is LB → IDS →265
Monitor and the total service chain path from the source to destination has
10 hops. Since that both IDS and Monitor are static NFs and do not modify
packets, their orders can be switched. By switching the position of IDS and
Monitor, the new service chain path (green dashed arrow in the figure) only has
8 hops. Furthermore, with heterogeneous NFBs (e.g., hardware or virtualized),270
there would be more opportunity for improving performance if re-ordering is
allowed.
Considering the re-ordering of service chain, we define Pi to be a set of
all possible NFs sequence of the service chain, i.e., Pi = {l1, l2, . . .}. For ex-
ample, suppose the service chain of pi is Firewall1 → IDS1 → FlowMon1,275
and the position of IDS1 and FlowMon1 can be swapped. Then, Pi = {l1 =
(Firewall1, IDS1, F lowMon1), l2 = (Firewall1, F lowMon1, IDS1)}. NFs of
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pi can be organized according to any sequence defined in Pi.
The policy pi is called satisfied if and only if the following condition holds:
pi[j] == l[j],∀j = 1, 2 . . . , Len(pi),∃l ∈ Pi (3)
The final assigned sequence of pi must be equal to l, where l can be any accepted280
list in Pi with re-ordering.
3.4. Heterogeneous network policy enforcement problem
The expected delay for the flow constrained by policy pi is defined as:
T (pi) = D(srci, pi)
+
len(pi)−1∑
j=1
(D(pi[j], pi[j + 1]) + tp(pi[j]))
+D(pi[Len(pi)], dsti)
(4)
We aims to reduce the total delay by efficiently placing network functions
onto heterogeneous NFBs while strictly adhering to network policies. Denote285
A(ni) to be the NFB which hosts ni, and H(bj) is the set of network functions
hosted by bj .
The Heterogeneous Network Policy Enforcement problem is defined as fol-
lows:
Definition 1. Given the set of policies P, NFBs B and delay matrix D, we need290
to find an appropriate allocation of network functions, which that minimizes the
total expected end-to-end delays of the network:
min
∑
pk∈P
T (pk)
s.t. pk is satisfied,∀pk ∈ P
A(ni) 6= ∅ && |A(ni)| = 1,∀ni ∈ pk,∀pk ∈ P∑
ni∈H(bj)
Req(ni) < Cap(bj),∀bj ∈ B
(5)
The first constraint ensure that network functions of all service chains are
appropriately accommodated by one NFB. The second constraint is the capacity
constraint of all NFBs.295
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The above problem can be easily proven to be NP-Hard :
Proof. To show that Heterogeneous Network Policy Enforcement problem is NP-
Hard, we will show that the Multiple Knapsack Problem (MKP) [21], whose
decision version has already been proven to be strongly NP complete, can be
reduced to this problem in polynomial time.300
Consider a special case of Heterogeneous Policy Enforcement problem that
the service chain of all policies contain only one network function. Assume
that transmission delays between servers and NFBs are the same and there are
enough NFBs, meaning that no NFBs are saturated.
Consider each network function ni to be an item, where its requirement305
Req(ni) is item size. Each NFB bj is a knapsack with limited capacity Cap(bj).
The profit of assigning ni to each NFB is the negative of the delays. Then the
Heterogeneous Network Policy Enforcement problem becomes finding an alloca-
tion of all network functions to NFBs, maximizing the total profit. Therefore,
the MKP problem is reducible to the Heterogeneous Policy Enforcement problem310
in polynomial time, and hence the Heterogeneous Policy Enforcement problem
is NP-hard.
4. Heterogeneous Policy Enforcement
In this section, we introduce HOOC, a Heterogeneous netwOrk pOlicy enforCement
scheme.315
4.1. Service chain network
We consider an online solution which process one service chain at a time
when a new policy requirement arrives.
For each policy pi, we need to find appropriate NFBs to accommodate all
network functions in pi with an objective to minimize its total expected delay320
T (pi). Considering re-ordering of service chain, for each candidate service chain
l ∈ Pi, we construct a graph Gl, which is a m-tier directed graph (m = Len(pi)).
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Nodes in the jth tier are NFBs defined by Bj :
Bj = {bk|l[j] ∈ TypeSet(bk) and∑
n∈A(bk)
Req(n) +Req(l[j]) ≤ Cap(bk),∀bk ∈ B} (6)
For a node x in jth (j ≤ m−1) tier and y in (j+1)th tier, there is a directed edges
from x to y if y is reachable from x and the weight of the edge is D(x, y)+ tp(y).325
It is possible that both x and y are the same NFB. In this case, D(x, y) = 0.
Then, for each l ∈ Pi, we can construct a graph Gl, and all those graphs
can be merged into one single graph G. During the merge operation, for any
l1 ∈ Pi and l2 ∈ Pi (l1 6= l2), if l1[j] = l2[j], nodes in j-th tier of Gl1 can be
merged with nodes of j-th tier in Gl2 accordingly. If two neighbor nodes x and330
y in Gl1 are merged to neighbor nodes x′ and y′ in Gl2 , the link between them
must have the same weight and can be merged too.
Flow originates from the source (srci) and terminate at the sink (dsti).
For a node x in 1st tier, the weight of the directed edges from srci to x is
D(srci, x)+ tp(s). For a node y in lth tier, the weight of the directed edges from335
y to dsti is D(y, dsti).
The resulted graph G is called the Service Chain Network of pi. An example
of service chain network is given in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Example of service chain network with length of 3.
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4.2. Shortest service chain path
According to the construction process of service chain networks, any paths340
from source to sink need to traverse all tiers, i.e., all NFs in the service chain.
Edges among different tiers ensure that all those NFs are in correct order that are
acceptable in Pi. And weights of edges are their corresponding delay. Thus, it is
clear that the route with the smallest expected latency for a flow is the shortest
path from source to sink. We referred this path as ssp (Shortest service chain345
path). However, since nodes in different tiers of the service chain network can
be the same NFB with limited capacity, we can not simply re-use traditional
shortest first path algorithms, e.g., Dijkstra, Floyd-Warshall.
The difficulty here is that two nodes that belong to different tiers in the
service chain network, say x and y, may be in the same NFB and share the350
same capacity. If we assign pi to x, it may saturate the NFB such that y can
not further accept pi. In this case, we call them conflict nodes. A path from
the source will be blocked by the latter one of the conflict nodes.
Hence, we design the SSP (Shortest Service Chain Path) algorithm to find
the shortest path in this situation, as shown in Algorithm 1. The d(v) is used355
to maintain the distance from source to vertex v. It is initialized to be infinite
and will be relaxed during the course of the algorithm. The set S contains
all vertices whose final shortest distance from the source have already been
determined. Conflict nodes are handled in line 14. The shortest service chain
path are maintained in prev and can be obtained through getPath().360
Obviously, the shortest service chain path in Algorithm 1 is a variant of
the Single-Source Shortest Path (SSSP) problem [22]. We have adapted it to
handle the conflict nodes during discovering the optimal path and it can be easily
proven to be able to always find the optimal path. And the complexity of the
algorithm depends on the way of finding the vertex v with the smallest distance365
d(v), i.e., the argmin operation. Because paths with conflict nodes failed to
reach the destination, not all vertices and edges are checked in Algorithm 1.
Thus, each vertex v ∈ V is added to set S at most once (line 6 ∼ 10), and
each edge in E is examined in the for loop of lines 12 ∼ 20 at most once
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during the course of the algorithm. A priority queue, which is a data structure370
consisting of a set of item-key pairs, can be implemented for efficient operation
of distanc for each vertex. Operations supported by priority queue can be
used to implement Algorithm 1: insert, e.g., implicit in line 2; extract-min,
returning the vertex with the minimum distance in line 6, i.e., the argmin
operation; and decrease-key, decreasing the distance of a given vertex in line 15.375
Furthermore, Fibonacci heaps [23] implement insert and decrease-key in O(1)
amortized time, and extract-min (i.e., argmin) in O(log n) amortized time,
where n is the number of elements in the priority queue [22]. So, by using
Fibonacci heaps, the running time of Algorithm 1 is O(|E|+ |V | log |V |), where
|E| is the number of edges and |V | is the number of vertices in the cost network.380
Network policy is often stable and is not transient. However, we reckon the
fact that traffic demand could change slowly over time and it is necessary to
adapt to the changes. This can be easily achieved in HOOC through SDN mech-
anism: the Policy Controller can periodically poll switches for traffic statistics
to look for changes in traffic demand in specific part of network topology, and385
then trigger HOOC to re-optimize the policies that have been affected.
4.3. Greedy Approach
Algorithm 1 ensures the optimality of the service chain path. However, it
has one major drawback that its O(|E|+ |V | log |V |) time complexity. Thus, we
also propose a greedy approach, which trades off small accuracy for significantly390
faster speed.
The greedy approach of HOOC is described in Algorithm 3. The main idea
of Greedy is that: for each element in the service chain, the algorithm will
choose a NFBs with the smallest delay to the source or previous NF in the
service chain. If current path is blocked by a conflict node, the algorithm will395
fall back to previous NF and choose the NFB with 2nd smallest delay. This
process will continue until the destination is reached, or there is no available
path. If multiple candidated service chain are available in Pi, the Bj contains
acceptable NFBs defined in Equation 6. Specially, for any l1 ∈ Pi and l2 ∈ Pi
18
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Figure 5: An example RTT for server pair (s1,s16)
(l1 6= l2), if l1[j] = l2[j], same NFBs obtained for l1 and l2 will be merged as a400
single node, otherwise, they will be treated as different nodes.
5. Implementation
5.1. Testbed
We have implemented on a proof-of-concept testbed consists of 16 Raspberry
Pis (Model 2B) [24], two Pronto 3295 SDN (2x48 ports) switches and a Ryu405
SDN controller running on an Intel’s Xeon E5-1604 4 cores CPU and 16GB
RAM. We constructed a fat-tree topology (k = 4) by logically slicing [25] two
pronto switches into 20 4-port SDN switches. As a result of slicing, we had to
manually construct the topology graph in the Ryu controller. However, we note
that Ryu has a built-in feature that can automatically learn network topologies410
if regular switches are used. Our example NFs are mainly simple container-
based firewalls [26]. We have also attached an IDS/IPS used in Section 2 to one
of spare SDN switch ports and is seen as a hardware NFB.
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Figure 6: Comparison of latency of service chain: (a) Average latency for various network
scale; (b) Latency of service chain for k = 20; (c) Average latency for various length of service
chain; (d) Latency of service chain for length = 4
5.2. Link latency
In order to obtain needed link latency we have implemented a reduced ver-415
sion of Pingmesh Agent [18] using C++ for better performance and accuracy.
This Pingmesh Agent pings all servers (i.e. Raspberry Pis) using TCPing, and
measures round-trip-time (RTT) from the TCP-SYN/SYN-ACK intervals. An
example server pair (s1, s16) RTT is shown in Figure 5. The average memory
footprint is less than 2MB, and the average CPU usage is less than 1%. Ping420
traffic is very small and ping interval is configurable according to actual needs.
The ping results are uploaded to the controller periodically for constructing
20
all pairs end-to-end latency table which can be queried using host IP address.
This is because we assume that most of deployed NFs will run in commodity
servers. There are also some in-network hardware NFBs, as defined in 3.1,425
that are either SDN switches or attached directly to the switches. Hence the
delay from/to these particular devices can be queried through OpenFlow’s port
statistics APIs or other technique such as OpenNetMon [27].
The processing delay of network functions is obtained from tis, which is
inverse proportional to NF’s capacity. We did not consider queueing delay in430
our testbed implementation because our algorithm ensures that NFBs are not
overloaded. We also note here that there are also some other techniques that
are useful for monitoring processing capacities such sFlow [28].
5.3. Policy controller
The policy controller is implemented as an application module in Ryu. We435
have chosen Ryu because it has a built in integration for Snort [14] that enables
bidirectional communication using unix domain socket. The controller interacts
with NFBs that host firewalls using OpenFlow protocol. Although frameworks
such as OpenNF [9] can also be added to enrich functionality of the controller, we
note that the scope of this paper is to provide a proof-of-concept implementation440
rather than a full-blown testbed.
In addition to managing NFBs, the controller is also responsible for collect-
ing link latency from Pingmesh Agent and maintaining an in-memory all-pair
unidirectional end-to-end latency table which is essential to the HOOC scheme.
6. Evaluation445
6.1. Evaluation environment and setup
In order to study the performance of HOOC scheme at scale, we have ex-
tensively evaluated it via ns-3 simulations in a fat-tree topology with factor
k ranged from 4 to 20 meaning that there are at most 2000 servers and 500
switches in these setups. The same controller which we use for testbed has been450
used during simulation via ns-3’s OpenFlow module.
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Each NFB in our simulations is modeled with random residual capacity
(number of packets it can process per second) and a set of network function
types that it supports. Therefore, a NFB can accept a network function as long
as it has sufficient residual capacity and the network function’s type is amongst455
its support list. We also note that NFV servers can support any types of network
functions. All NFBs are deployed in the network, including OpenFlow switches,
hardware middleboxes and NFV servers.
In all experiments, traffic flows are randomly generated to transmit packets
between two servers. Each flow is required to traverse a sequence of various net-460
work functions – the service chain – before being forwarded to their destination
as specified by policies. In our experiments, the service chains are comprised
of 1∼4 network functions (normal distribution) including FW, IPS, RE, LB,
IDS and (traffic) Monitor [3]. A centralized controller is implemented to collect
all network information that is needed, as defined in Section 3 to perform the465
HOOC scheme.
Both optimal and greedy approaches for HOOC are implemented. For sim-
plicity, the scheme using SSP to achieve optimal schedule for a service chain is
referred as HOOC-SSP, and the greedy approach is referred as HOOC-Greedy.
In order to compare and contrast the performance of HOOC, we have also im-470
plemented a Brute-force approach: By using a DFS (Depth-first search) method,
Brute-force approach exhaustively search all NFBs and all possible service chain
allocation paths to find the one with smallest latency. Brute-force will give the
optimal results but it is not suitable for large-scale network as the cost for
searching all permutations will become prohibitively expensive as the search475
space grows.
6.2. Evaluation results
We first study the performance of HOOC with regard to the latency of service
chain as demonstrated in Figure 6. Figure 6a shows the average latency of all
service chain under different network scales with the factor k of fat-tree ranging480
from 4 to 20. It shows that on average HOOC-SSP can always find a service
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chain path with the same latency as that of Brute-force, which is optimal. In
comparison, the HOOC-Greedy approach cloud fall behind both HOOC-SSP
and Brute-force by up to 23%.
We further show a detailed breakdown view in Figure 6b that HOOC-SSP485
and Brute-force schemes have identical CDF of latency for all policies for a large
scale network when k = 20. Particularly, they can outperform HOOC-Greedy
scheme by 38% at 99 percentile.
Figure 6c reveals that average latency increases linearly with the length of
service chain when all NFBs have sufficient capacity for accommodating all490
network functions. The breakdown of CDF for latency of service chain whose
length is comprised of four network functions shown in Figure 6d. It unveils that
amongst HOOC’s two algorithms, HOOC-SSP can outperform HOOC-Greedy
by 21%.
Next we study the performance of different schemes in term of system run-495
ning time. This is essentially to test the performance of HOOC controller for
its efficiency and scalability in cloud data center environment. Figure 7 shows
the average total running time to process a policy increases exponentially for
all schemes. Nevertheless, as we can see from this figure that HOOC-Greedy
is the most efficient methods, consuming only 2.8s and 3.7s for k = 18 and500
k = 20 respectively to complete a cycle. This is because HOOC-Greedy scheme
has the smallest search space. On the contrary, HOOC-SSP can complete one
NFs placement cycle for k = 18 and k = 20 at 10s and 23s respectively, and
Brute-force takes up to 149s and 232s for k = 18 and k = 20 respectively.
The results indicate that HOOC-SSP and HOOC-Greedy can be nearly 9 and505
61 times faster than Brute-force. Among HOOC-SSP and HOOC-Greedy, the
latter is 5 times more efficient that the former one.
As we have already presented in Section 4 that HOOC-SSP is comprised of
constructing a service chain network and finding shortest service chain paths.
Figure 7 also demonstrates that 63% of HOOC-SSP time are consumed on510
constructing the service chain network, whereas finding shortest service chain
paths merely accounts for 37% of the time. Clearly, this indicates that in order
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to further improve the efficiency of HOOC-SSP whilst retaining optimality, we
should investigate into optimizing the efficiency of constructing service chain
network. We will leave this as part of our future work. However, Figure 7515
demonstrates that when efficiency becomes the foremost consideration HOOC-
Greedy can strike a good balance between efficiency and its approximation to
the optimal.
7. Related Works
The configuration of network connectivity is governed by network policies.520
When deployed, a policy is translated and implemented as one or more packet
processing rules in a diverse range of “middleboxes” (MBs) such as firewalls
(e.g. ALLOW TCP 80), load balancers, Intrusion Detection and Prevention
Systems (IDS/IPS), and application acceleration boxes [29]. With network pro-
grammability enabled by SDN and NFV technologies, such rules can also be525
implemented outside of traditional “middleboxes” in network switches [30] as
well as end-hosts [31]. One of the design requirements for today’s cloud data
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centres is to support the insertion of new middleboxes [32].
Recent studies have focused primarily on exploiting SDN and NFV to en-
sure correct policy compositions and enforcement [2][7][8], consolidating policy530
rules to end hosts [31] and network switches [33], or providing a framework
for migrating middleboxes states [9], or policy-aware application placement to
incorporate policy requirements [16][29][34].
Nevertheless, this body of work has only partially addressed the problem
since, with SDN and NFV, both the number of entities that generate and imple-535
ment policies independently and dynamically have increased manyfold. Given
the large variety of network function entities in terms of both types and loca-
tions, inappropriate selections not only eliminate the advantage of SDN and
NFV but could also cause severe consequences including data centre outage.
Many data centre applications are sensitive to latencies. One source of la-540
tency is network congestion as throughput-intensive applications causes queue-
ing at switches that delays traffic from latency-sensitive applications. Existing
techniques to combat queueing are to prioritise flows such that packets from
latency-sensitive flows can “jump” the queue [11]; to centrally schedule all flows
for every server so no flows will have to queue [35]; or to pace end host packets545
to achieve guaranteed bandwidth for guaranteed queueing [10].
These techniques assume shortest path forwarding. Today’s data centre fab-
rics have rich path-redundancy in nature, non-shortest paths can be exploited to
use path redundancy and spare capacity for mitigating network congestion [36].
As policy rules chaining can effectively shape the network traffic (packets need550
to follow policy path), they can be chained over non-shortest paths to mitigate
congestion-led queueing since propagation delay on physical links are predictable
and smaller than queueing delay.
A primary study on heterogeneous network function boxes environment is
provided in our previous work [37] and a HOPE scheme is proposed. However,555
HOOC is different with previous work in the following ways: Firstly, a thor-
ough test-bed experiments are also performed to show the heterogeneity among
different NFB implementations; Secondly, the service chain re-ordering is consid-
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ered, where NFs can be opportunistically re-ordered for improving performance.
Thirdly, The detailed implementation of the Greedy version is introduced in this560
paper; Finally, a proof-of-concept testbed and some issues of implementations
in practice are discussed.
8. Conclusion
Network policies and service chains are important for the security and reli-
ability of data center network today. In practice, network functions of policies565
can be deployed in different environment, e.g., OpenFlow switches, hardware
middleboxes and NFV servers. Such heterogeneous environment for policy al-
location remain unexplored in previous research works. In this paper, we study
the Heterogeneous Policy Enforcement Problem with a focus on the latency. We
first prove that the optimization problem is NP-Hard, then simplified the prob-570
lem and proposed HOOC, which is proved to be able to find the optimal service
chain path for each policy. Extensive simulation results and comparisons with
Brute-force approach have demonstrated high effectiveness and optimality of
HOOC. The future direction of this work will be to investigate efficient service
chain network construction.575
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Algorithm 1 SSP:Shortest Service Chain Path
Input: Service chain Network G(V,E), pi, B,N, D
Output: Shortest service chain path to dsti
1: S ← ∅
2: d(v)←∞,∀v ∈ V
3: prev[v]← undefined, ∀v ∈ V
4: d(srci)← 0
5: while S 6= V do
6: u← argminv∈V \S d(v)
7: if u = dsti then
8: break
9: end if
10: S ← S ∩ {u}
11: nk ← network function in pi that will be placed in u
12: for each neighbor v of u do
13: if d(v) > d(u) +D(u, v) then
14: if v 6∈ getPath(prev, u) or ∑nj∈H(v)Req(nj) + Req(nk) ≤
Cap(v) then
15: d(v)← d(u) +D(u, v)
16: prev[v]← u
17: prev[v].nf ← nk
18: end if
19: end if
20: end for
21: end while
22: return getPath(prev, dsti)
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Algorithm 2 getPath(prev, dst)
1: ssp← ∅
2: l← ∅
3: u← dst
4: while prev[u] is defined do
5: insert u at the beginning of ssp
6: insert prev[u].nf at the beginning of l
7: u← prev[u]
8: end while
9: insert u at the beginning of ssp
10: return ssp and l
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Algorithm 3 Greedy
Input: pi, B,N, D
Output: Service chain path to dsti
1: path← ∅
2: B′j ← Bj ,∀j = 1, 2 . . . ,Len(pi)
3: j ← 1
4: while j ≤Len(pi) do
5: if B′j = ∅ then
6: j ← j − 1
7: if j < 1 then
8: path← ∅ . no available path
9: break
10: end if
11: remove last node in path
12: B′j+1 ← Bj+1
13: continue
14: end if
15: u← argminv∈B′j D(path[end], v)
16: B′j ← B′j \ {u}
17: nk ← network function in pi that will be placed in u
18: if u 6∈ path or ∑n′∈H(u)Req(n′) +Req(nk) ≤ Cap(u) then
19: append u at the end of path
20: if j =Len(pi) then
21: break
22: else
23: j ← j + 1
24: end if
25: end if
26: end while
27: return path
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